Abstract. Nominal logic is a variant of first-order logic in which abstract syntax with names and binding is formalized in terms of two basic operations: name-swapping and freshness. It relies on two important principles: equivariance (validity is preserved by name-swapping), and fresh name generation ("new" or fresh names can always be chosen). It is inspired by a particular class of models for abstract syntax trees involving names and binding, drawing on ideas from Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory: finite-support models in which each value can depend on only finitely many names.
§1. Introduction. In traditional presentations of formal languages with variable binding, such as first-order logic, higher-order logic or the λ-calculus [2] , capture-avoiding substitution is defined as a relation or partial function, then α-equivalence is defined in terms of capture-avoiding substitution. Only then can capture-avoiding substitution be lifted to a total function on α-equivalence classes. This state of affairs leads to substantial complexity at the level of syntax which is avoided in informal reasoning using conventions such as Barendregt's Variable Convention. Unfortunately, proofs that use such informal conventions require considerable effort to formalize.
Gabbay and Pitts [17] proposed that ideas from Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models of set theory (FM-set theory) [11, 10, 21, 38] should be used to reason about name-binding and fresh names in abstract syntax. In this approach, the atoms of FM-set theory are identified with the names of an object language. In FM-set theory, sets are acted upon by a group of permutations of atoms; these permutations can be identified with bijective renamings. In addition, important concepts such as freshness (independence of a value from a particular name) and α-equivalence (identification of expressions up to consistent renaming) can be formulated in terms of names and permutations. We call this approach nominal abstract syntax.
In nominal abstract syntax, the primitive notions of name-swapping and freshness (that is, the relation (−) / ∈ F V (−)) can be used to define α-equivalence.
Capture-avoiding substitution and other functions and relations can then be inductively defined as functions on α-equivalence classes rather than defined as relations on concrete syntax trees. In this approach, definitions and proofs can be carried over almost verbatim from informal, conventional versions. Though the idea of basing a theory of syntax with names and binding on name-swapping rather than ordinary renamings may seem strange, bijective (or equivalently, injective) renamings have played an understated role in accounts of syntax dating to Frege: Replacing a German letter [bound name] everywhere in its scope by some other one is, of course, permitted, so long as in places where different letters initially stood different ones also stand afterward. This has no effect on the content. [12] Nominal abstract syntax is of interest because most areas of logic and theoretical computer science rely on some form of reasoning about name-binding or choosing fresh names, for example in pure logic:
• quantified variables and eigenvariables in natural deduction/sequent calculus quantifier rules [34] , • Skolemization or adjunction of witnessing constants in Henkin-style completeness proofs [19] , • labels or world identifiers in tableaux or labelled natural deduction systems for modal, temporal, relevant, and other nonclassical logics [35, 39] , and in computer science:
• variable names generated during capture-avoiding substitution in the lambda-calculus [7, 2] and in functional programming languages [28] , • memory cell references in models of dynamic memory allocation [29] , • channel names in the π-calculus [27] , • state names in automata constructions [20] , • object identifiers and record field labels in object-oriented programming languages [18] • fresh values and field names in database query languages [1] • program location labels in dataflow analyses [31] , • and nonces (random or globally unique tokens) in security protocols [30, 25] . The need to deal with abstract syntax with bound names up to "safe" renaming has given rise to a great deal of research. In combinatory logic [36, 8] , complex functions can be built up out of basic operations called combinators without using explicit names or binding. In higher-order abstract syntax [7, 32] , all binding constructs present in a language (for example, quantifiers) are reduced to lambda-abstraction. In Stoy diagrams [37] or de Bruijn's name-free encodings [9] , closed lambda-calculus expressions are expressed by using pointers or numerical references instead of variables so that α-equivalence becomes literal equality. Such name-free approaches provide first-order axiomatizations of higher-order languages such as the lambda-calculus: indeed, de Bruijn-style representations are frequently used as the internal higher-order metalanguage in systems based on higher-order abstract syntax.
All of these approaches are powerful, subtle, and applicable to both theory and practice, but none provides support for dealing with objects that can contain an unknown number of free names, as is the case in all but the first two examples above. Moreover, in all of the approaches, names either disappear entirely or are "second-class", and can only appear in binding positions, never in more general data structures (for example, simultaneous substitutions represented as lists of variable-value pairs). This is not acceptable in many of the situations listed above: we often need to manipulate expressions that mention an unknown number of free names, to reason directly about freshness (that is, names not appearing in expressions), and to choose fresh names in the course of arguments.
In contrast, nominal abstract syntax provides a unified theory of both bound and free names in which names are "first-class" mathematical (or computational) objects on the same footing as integers or data structures. Though not all of the applications listed above involve name-binding, each does involve fresh name generation. In each case, failure to choose sufficiently fresh names can lead to subtle errors in reasoning or calculations. Because it not only deals with binding syntax but also speaks directly to issues such as freshness and fresh name generation, nominal abstract syntax in well-suited to formal reasoning about all of the above situations.
However, Gabbay and Pitts' original formulation of nominal abstract syntax in FM-set theory seems to rely on nonstandard mathematical foundations; in particular, the Axiom of Choice is (by design) inconsistent with FM-set theory. In addition, many applications of nominal abstract syntax do not seem to require the full power of set theory. In fact, all of the important concepts of nominal abstract syntax can be presented as a theory of first-order logic, called nominal logic, introduced by Pitts [33] .
In this paper we provide an overview of nominal logic and then consider and solve a previously unresolved issue in its semantics. In particular, nominal logic is incomplete relative to the intended semantics proposed by Pitts. We identify a class of models with respect to which nominal logic is complete; moreover, any first-order model of nominal logic (considered as a first-order theory) is isomorphic to a model in this class. We prove completeness for the core of nominal logic, and sketch how the proof extends to full nominal logic. The main insight is that the concept of finite support in the intended semantics of nominal logic presented by Pitts must be generalized to a cardinality-independent notion of small support given by a proper ideal of subsets of the set of all names.
We also investigate the theory of Herbrand models for nominal logic. Because of the presence of existentially quantified axioms in nominal logic (and because nominal logic is not closed under Skolemization), the first-order version of Herbrand's theorem does not apply. Moreover, as Pitts noted, there are not enough closed terms in the original approach to nominal logic for sensible Herbrand universes to exist, because the presence of closed terms denoting names is inconsistent with Pitts' axiomatization of nominal logic. We solve this problem by considering Herbrand universes over terms constructed using function symbols, abstractions, and name-constants (which are treated differently than ordinary constants). We prove an appropriate generalization of Herbrand's Theorem: consistent nominal-universal theories (consisting of N-or ∀-quantified formulas only) always have nominal Herbrand models.
∀y: A S.∃a:A, x:S. y ≈ a x Figure 1 . Axioms of nominal logic §2. Nominal Abstract Syntax and Logic. Pitts [33] presented nominal logic as a theory of sorted first-order logic. Technically, nominal logic is not a single theory, but a family of theories, one for each language L specifying the primitive sort, constant, function, and relation symbols. The sorts include primitive data-sorts D and name-sorts A; also, if A is a name-sort and S a sort then A S is a sort called the abstraction of A and S. Additional sort constructions such as products may be added without difficulty. In what follows, we use A, A for arbitrary name-sorts and S, S for arbitrary sorts.
The term language includes a swapping function symbol (− −)·− : A × A × S → S, and an abstraction function symbol − − : A × S → A S. The relation symbols of nominal logic include equality − ≈ − : S × S, and − # − : A × S. Additional constants, functions, and relation symbols may also be present; constant symbols are considered to be nullary function symbols. We augment Pitts' syntax of nominal logic with countably many name-constants of each name-type A, written using German letters a, b, x, y : A. Finally, nominal logic includes a novel "new" or "fresh name" quantifier N; if A is a name-sort, a:A, and φ(a) is a well-formed formula then Na:A.φ is also a well-formed formula.
The axioms are shown in Figure 1 . The swapping axioms (S1-S3) describe the behavior of the swapping function; the equivariance axioms (E1-E5) ascribe a name-independence property to first-order constant, function, and relation symbols; the freshness axioms (F 1-F 5) describe the properties of the freshness relation; axiom schema (Q) defines the meaning of the N-quantifier; and the abstraction axioms (A1, A2) describe the properties of the abstraction function symbol. We write NL for the set of axioms described by Figure 1 and NL for first-order provability from NL.
The axiom (F 5) is new; it asserts that any two syntactically distinct nameconstants denote different names. Moreover, the equivariance axiom (E3) does not apply to name-constants, only to first-order function symbols and constants.
Proposition 2.1. The following formulas are theorems of nominal logic:
Let φ be a well-formed formula with F V (φ) ⊆ { x}. Then we have
Proof. Most of these properties are shown by Pitts. The rest are straightforward.
2.1. A theory of the syntax of the lambda-calculus. As an example of the expressiveness of nominal logic, we show how the abstract syntax of the lambda-calculus [2] can be formalized as a theory Γ Λ of nominal logic. We also prove some simple properties concerning capture-avoiding substitution. We consider a language including one datatype exp for lambda-terms, one name-sort var for lambda-calculus variable names, and the following function symbols:
We use a, b, c for variables of type var, and M, N for variables of type exp. First, we give axioms expressing that var, lam, and app are injective functions, and their ranges are disjoint:
Let P (x) be a formula with with a free parameter x:exp (and possibly other parameters). We can express a structural induction principle over expressions as follows:
, so the Nquantified name a in the third case must be fresh for any additional parameters of P .
The axioms (9)- (14) together with all instances of (Λ ind ) form the theory Γ Λ .
Remark 2.2. The axioms concerning injectivity and range-disjointness of the function symbols var, app, lam may seem counterintuitive, because in many settings it is customary to view λ-terms as equal up to α-, β-, and η-equivalence, not just α-equivalence. However, we are axiomatizing the syntax of the lambdacalculus, not its semantics. From a syntactic point of view, the var, app, and lam functions are injective: two syntax trees are equal only if they are structurally equal (in this case, up to α-equivalence). Our axiomatization formalizes the concepts of α-equivalence and capture-avoiding substitution that are usually treated informally. It is possible to introduce an explicit equivalence relation ≡ for βη-equivalence.
In this axiomatization, we can prove (using the induction principle) the existence of a function −[−/−] : exp × exp × var → exp satisfying the following properties: (18) Note that in the last formula, the ordering of the quantifiers implies that b # a and b # N . Reading b # M as b ∈ F V (M ), these axioms correspond precisely to Barendregt's definition of capture-avoiding substitution [2] .
The β and η reduction relations are also definable, using the following formulas:
along with reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and congruence properties, if desired. Note that the a # M constraint corresponds to the traditional sidecondition a ∈ F V (M ) on η-reduction.
As an example application of nominal logic, we prove two elementary properties of capture-avoiding substitution. These proofs are essentially transliterations of proofs from Barendregt [2, Chapter 2].
Proof. Proof is by induction on the structure of M . If M ≈ var(c), then there are three cases, depending on whether
, then by induction we have
so we can calculate that
, where c is fresh, then without loss of generality we may assume that c # a, b, N, N . Then by induction we have
This completes the proof.
Remark 2.5. The above proof should seem trivial, and this is the point: nominal abstract syntax facilitates a rigorous style of reasoning with names and binding that is close to intuition and informal practice. Moreover, it provides an equational theory for dealing with expressions involving names and binding using standard algebraic and logical techniques. This advantage is shared by name-free approaches such as combinatory logic or de Bruijn indices. However, these approaches rely on cleverly getting rid of explicit names. As a result, it can be awkward or impossible to reason about situations involving free names, and even when possible, such reasoning is very unlike informal reasoning. In contrast, we can reason directly with free names in nominal abstract syntax in a formal, yet intuitive way.
We conclude the example by discussing the possible models of our lambdacalculus theory. Clearly, the intended (standard) model M Λ is given by interpreting exp as Λ/ ≡α , where Λ is the set of abstract syntax trees representing lambda-terms with variables from var MΛ , and ≡ α is α-equivalence (defined in the traditional way [2] ). In this structure, we interpret ≈ as α-equivalence, # as the "not a free variable of" relation (−) ∈ F V (−), and (−)[−/−] as captureavoiding substitution on α-equivalence classes, as traditionally defined.
This "standard" model of our theory has an important property: since terms are finite, F V (t) is finite for each term t; therefore, no finite collection of terms can exhaust the infinite set of names var MΛ , so fresh names may always be chosen. However, because of the compactness of first-order logic, nonstandard models including objects mentioning infinitely many names must also exist. In a nonstandard model, we may not be justified in believing that an infinite term M ∞ mentions only finitely many names. Instead, we can only be certain that M ∞ does not exhaust all the names, for this would violate (F 4). For example, M ∞ could be interpreted as an infinite term app(x 2 , app(x 4 , app(x 6 , app(x 8 , · · · )))) mentioning all variable names with even indices in some enumeration {x 1 , x 2 , . . . }.
This shows that models in which values depend on only finitely many names are insufficient in theory. Does this really matter in practice? Yes, because there are situations involving values that mention infinitely many distinct names without exhausting all possible names. One example is infinitary lambda-calculus [23] , where the problem of running out of fresh variables is dealt with by implicitly renaming x i to x 2i whenever necessary. Even when the terms of interest are finite, we might want to deal with infinite sets of terms, possibly mentioning infinitely many names (for example, an infinite theory). In addition, the behavior of nonterminating programs involving dynamic allocation can be modeled as an infinite state sequence mentioning infinitely many distinct names [15] .
This concludes our exposition of nominal logic. The rest of this paper is concerned with identifying appropriate classes of models of nominal logic and proving completeness results. In Section 3, we review Pitts' finite-support semantics for nominal logic and explain why it is incomplete. In Section 4, we introduce a larger class of models based on a generalized notion of "small" supports generated by a proper ideal on the set of names. In Sections 3 and 4, we make the simplifying assumption that there is only one name-sort and that N-quantified formulas and abstractions are absent. Although these features are very useful in applications, they are irrelevant to the completeness issue we wish to resolve, since incompleteness problems arise already for the core logic involving only swapping, freshness, and one name-sort. The semantics we develop (and its proof of completeness) can be generalized to accommodate multiple namesorts, the N-quantifier, and abstractions without difficulty; these extensions are sketched in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 generalizes Herbrand models to nominal logic and proves a suitable generalization of Herbrand's Theorem. §3. Finite-Support Models. The development of nominal logic was motivated by a particular semantics: the universe of finitely-supported nominal sets, or sets X equipped with a name-swapping operation (− −)·− such that each element x is supported by a finite set S of names such that (a a )·x = x for any names a, a ∈ S. Under these assumptions, minimum finite supports exist, and nominal sets and swapping-preserving functions form a topos 1 admitting constructions such as cartesian products, finitely-supported power sets P FS (−), finitelysupported function spaces (−) → FS (−), and quotients of swapping-preserving equivalence relations.
We start by considering a set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . } of at least countably many names. We write (− −)·− for the name-swapping function defined as follows:
where |X| is some carrier set, such that
and such that for each x ∈ |X|, there is a finite set S such that
We write Nom FS for the class of all FS-nominal sets. Note that the first part of the definition is equivalent to saying that X is a G-set, where G is the set of all finite permutations on A. We write S x when (23) holds and supp X (x) for {S ⊆ A | S x}. (This definition of support differs from Pitts', but is equivalent and more convenient here). It is not difficult to show that for x ∈ X ∈ Nom FS , supp X (x) x (see Lemma 4.4 below). Also, observe that A is a nominal set whose swapping operation (− −)· A − is given by (19) . Note that supp A (a) = {a}.
An element x of a nominal set X is said to be equivariant if its support is empty
Note that equivariant functions and relations are equivariant as elements of P FS (X × Y ) and P FS (X 1 × · · · × X n ), so no ambiguity ensues.
A finite-support structure (FS-structure) M for nominal logic is a first-order structure in which A is interpreted as the name set A, data-sorts D are interpreted as nominal sets D M , and the constant, function, and relation symbols are interpreted as equivariant values, functions, and relations respectively of the appropriate sorts. Name-symbols are interpreted as (distinct) names of their respective sorts. As usual, ≈: S × S is interpreted as equality on S M . In addition, (− −)·− : A × A × X → X is interpreted as (− −)· X −, and #: A × S is interpreted as the (equivariant) relation {(a, s) | a ∈ supp(s)} on A × S M . Valuations, satisfiability, validity, models, and other standard concepts are defined as usual for FS-structures, except that we write FS-satisfiable, FS-model, etc. as necessary to distinguish these concepts from those of ordinary first-order logic.
Pitts showed that nominal logic is sound with respect to FS-structures:
Proof. We sketch the proof. The swapping axioms follow from (20)- (22), the equivariance axioms follow because FS-structures interpret all constant, function and relation symbols as equivariant constants, functions, and relations; and the freshness axioms follow from basic properties of supp X (x). In particular, (F 1) follows from (23), (F 2) from the fact that supp A (a) = {a}, and (F 4) from the fact that A is infinite whereas i supp Xi (x i ) is finite for any finite collection of values x i ∈ X i . The new axiom (F 5) follows from the requirement that different name-constants are interpreted as distinct names.
Pitts also observed that nominal logic was incomplete with respect to the finite-support semantics. He presented the following counterexample. 
The first two axioms ensure that N M contains at least countably many distinct equivariant values n 0 = z
is injective. Pitts showed that d cannot have finite support. Intuitively, the reason is that because f and each n k is equivariant, the support of d must include {f (d, n k ) | k ∈ N}, but this set must be countably infinite because f is injective at d. However, the above theory has a first-order model, obtained by taking
, and taking the witness d to be the inclusion map from N into R. We omit the details.
A much simpler counterexample to compactness (hence also completeness) is as follows.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a set of formulas Γ which is finitely FS-satisfiable but not FS-satisfiable.
Proof. Let {y 1 , y 2 , . . . } be a countably infinite family of variables of sort A. Let x : D be a variable of sort D. Define Γ = {¬(y i # x) | i ∈ N} ∪ {y i = y j | i < j ∈ N} For any finite subset Γ ⊆ Γ, we can interpret D as P fin (A) and x as {a 1 , . . . , a n } and each y i as a distinct name a i ∈ A, where n is the largest index among the y i appearing in Γ . This is a FS-model of Γ . However, Γ is clearly not satisfiable in any FS-structure, because it asserts the existence of an element with infinite support. §4. A Sound and Complete Semantics. By the completeness of firstorder logic, a consistent theory Γ of nominal logic has a first-order model obtained from the consistent first-order theory NL ∪ Γ. We wish to characterize the first-order structures that are models of nominal logic up to isomorphism. We have established that finite-support models are too restrictive. On the other hand, there are many first-order structures that fail to satisfy NL. In particular, the class of models based on G-sets with no finite-support restriction is too large: some structures may include elements with respect to which no fresh names can be chosen. Another obvious approach is to generalize from countably many names and finite support to |A| = κ ≥ ω and requiring supports to be of cardinality smaller than κ. However, by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for first-order logic, we know that any consistent theory of nominal logic (over a countable language) has some countable model, so this approach is also too restrictive, since it omits some models.
The original motivation for FS-models was that syntactic objects are usually finite, so in the presence of countably many names, fresh names can always be chosen for finite collections of finitely-supported objects. However, the finitesupport property, though sufficient, is not necessary for the fresh name generation principle to be valid, as our counterexamples to completeness suggest. Instead, all that is necessary is to ensure that supports are small, and the set of all names is large, in some sense (not necessarily related to cardinality) such that no large set can be covered by the union of finitely many small sets. This inspires the following definition: Definition 4.1. A support ideal I is a subset of P(A) such that: 1. if S, T ∈ I then S ∪ T ∈ I, 2. if S ⊆ T ∈ I then S ∈ I, 3. if a ∈ A then {a} ∈ I, and 4. A / ∈ I.
that is, a proper ideal on the lattice (P(A), ⊆) containing all singletons.
Remark 4.2. P fin (A) is the least support ideal; conversely, no cofinite subset of A can be in a support ideal. More generally, if A is of cardinality κ, then P <κ (A) = {S ⊆ A | |S| < κ} is a support ideal. In addition, the set of sparse (nowhere dense) subsets of Q and the set of subsets of R of Lebesgue measure zero are support ideals not based on cardinality.
A support ideal can be extended by adding an infinite, co-infinite subset U ⊆ A such that neither U not A − U is in I. For example, if A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . } is some enumeration of A, P fin (A) ∪ {a 1 , a 3 , a 5 , . . . } and P fin (A) ∪ {a 1 , a 3 , a 5 , . . . } ∪ {a 1 , a 3 , a 6 , . . . } generate support ideals. However, P fin (A) ∪ {a 1 , a 3 , a 5 , . . . } ∪ {a 2 , a 4 , a 6 , . . . } does not generate a support ideal.
From now on, let I be a fixed, but arbitrary, support ideal. Definition 4.3. An IS-nominal set (over I) X = (|X|, · X ) is a structure satisfying parts (20)- (22) of Definition 3.1 and such that for each x ∈ |X|, there is an S ∈ I such that S x. Given such an X, we define supp X (x) = {S ∈ I | S x}.
We write Nom(I) for the class of all IS-nominal sets over I. One of the most important properties of FS-nominal sets is the existence of minimum supports. We need to verify this for IS-nominal sets.
Lemma 4.4. For any X ∈ Nom(I) and x ∈ X, supp X (x) x.
Proof. Let a, a ∈ A − supp X (x) be given. Then there exist sets T, U ∈ I such that T x, U x, a ∈ A − T , and a ∈ A − U . Also, T ∪ U ∈ I, so we may Hence, supp X (x) x. Now that we have established that IS-nominal sets have the minimum support property, it is straightforward 2 to verify that Nom(I) is a topos with many properties in common with Nom FS ; in particular, product, sum, exponential, power set, and quotient constructions are all well-behaved. Hence, we can define IS-structures, IS-models, IS-satisfiable, IS , etc. analogously to the finite-support case.
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness). If Γ NL φ then Γ IS φ.
Proof. As for FS-models, most of the axioms of nominal logic are easy to verify for IS-nominal set models. The fresh name generation axiom (F 4) follows from part (4) of the definition of support ideals.
We now show our main result: every first-order model of NL∪Γ is isomorphic to an IS-model of Γ. Completeness, compactness, and Lowenheim-Skolem theorems for IS-models then follow from the corresponding properties of first-order logic. Proof. Let M NL ∪ Γ be given. We wish to construct an IS-model. First, we take the set of names A to be the interpretation of A in M, that is, A M . We must also exhibit a support ideal that includes a support for each element of M. We define the M-support of an element x of M to be the set of names not fresh for x according to M:
2 Detailed constructions and proofs are given in [6, Chapter 3] Now let I be the set generated by taking all possible finite unions and subsets of M-supports, i.e.,
Clearly, I is closed under taking subsets and pairwise unions, so parts (1) and (2) of the definition of support ideal are satisfied. To verify that I is a support ideal, it remains to check properties (3) and (4). For (3), if a ∈ A is a name, then we wish to show that {a} ∈ I. But note that supp
This completes the proof that I forms a support ideal. We define an ISmodel I by interpreting sorts S as the nominal sets S N consisting of the sets S M equipped with the swapping action on S M given by M's interpretation of the swapping function symbol. These form IS-nominal sets supported by I, since each element of x ∈ M is supported by supp M (x) ∈ I; moreover, # Corollary 4.9 (Löwenheim-Skolem). If Γ is a consistent theory over a language L then it has an IS-model of any cardinality κ ≥ max(|L|, ω). §5. Extensions. So far, we have considered only the core of nominal logic, by assuming that there is only one name-sort and that N-quantifiers and abstractions are absent. The above results can be extended to cover full nominal logic without difficulty. We sketch how this can be done without going into exhaustive detail.
5.1. Multiple Name-Sorts. In the discussion so far, we have considered only a single name-sort A which is interpreted as A. If multiple name-sorts are present, then we need to assume that A contains several disjoint large nameset A 1 , A 2 , . . . ; the swapping operation (a a )·b is meaningful only for compatible names a, a ∈ A i for some i. Different name-sorts must be interpreted as disjoint, large subsets A i ⊆ A, in order to satisfy both axiom (F 3) (which guarantees that different name-sets are disjoint) and (F 4) (which implies that name-sets must be large).
5.2. Name-Abstraction. We consider the following abstraction construction on IS-nominal sets.
Definition 5.1. Let A be a large name set and X a nominal set. Let ≡ α be the least equivalence relation on A × X satisfying:
We write a x for [(a, x)] ≡α .
It is not difficult to show that:
If X is an IS-nominal set and ≡ an equivariant equivalence relation on X, then X/ ≡ is an IS-nominal set. 
Consequently, if we interpret abstraction sorts as the abstraction construction
and interpret the abstraction function symbol as the abstraction function
then the relevant axioms (E5), (A1), (A2) are satisfied. Conversely, any firstorder model of nominal logic involving abstractions can be shown to be isomorphic to a standard model defined in terms of the abstraction construction given here. 5.3. The N-quantifier. In Pitts' axiomatization, the meaning of the Nquantifier is given via an axiom scheme (Q), so adding N to the language does not affect completeness. However, this reductive approach obscures the semantics of N, and could be undesirable when considering nonclassical logics involving N. In this section, we provide an explicit rule for determining the satisfiability of N-quantified formulas. In what follows, we fix a model M and write ρ φ for the satisfiability relation where ρ is a IS-valuation, i.e. a function from the set of variables to M such that if x : S, then ρ(x) : S M for each variable x ∈ dom(ρ). If we take axiom (Q) literally as a definition of the meaning of N, we have
Dually, according to (8), we have
In both cases F V (φ) ⊆ {a, x}.
These definitions are rather unsatisfying because their reliance on the syntactic form of φ makes it difficult to see what N really means. In Gabbay and Pitts' original work, N was motivated as quantifying over "all but finitely many names", and defined as Na.φ(a) ⇐⇒ {b ∈ A | φ(b)} ∈ P fin (A) This approach to defining N seems much simpler than the literal definitions derived from its NL characterizations. We can generalize this approach to ISstructures as follows:
that is, Na.φ holds if the set of names a for which φ holds is large.
Proposition 5.5. The semantic characterizations of N given by (30) , (31) , and (32) are equivalent.
Proof. Clearly, (30) and (31) are equivalent, because ∃a.a # x ∧ φ ⇐⇒ ∀a.a # x ⊃ φ is a theorem of nominal logic without (Q) [33] . Let S = x supp(ρ( x)) and let
φ}. Assume ρ Na.φ according to (31) . Then T = A − S, which is large since S is small. Hence ρ Na.φ according to (32) . Next, assume (32) holds, that is, T is large. Since S is small, T − S is large so nonempty. Hence ρ Na.φ according to (30) . §6. Nominal Herbrand models. First-order (sorted) logic satisfies an important property called Herbrand's Theorem: every collection of universal formulas has a model built up out of closed terms. This fact underlies a great deal of the theory of automated reasoning and logic programming for first-order logic. The purpose of this section is to generalize Herbrand's theorem to nominal logic, thereby laying a foundation for extending first-order logic programming and automated reasoning techniques to nominal logic.
Since nominal logic can be axiomatized as a Hilbert-style theory of ordinary first-order logic, one might speculate that the existing theory of first-order Herbrand models can be used as is. However, Herbrand's Theorem need not be true of an arbitrary theory, and in particular, it is not true of Pitts' axiomatization of NL since it includes existential axioms. For example, the freshness axiom (F 4) reads
In Pitts' formulation, ground terms are always provably equivariant, that is, ∀a:A.a # t is provable for any closed term t. (Note that this is not a theorem of NL, but a meta-theoretic property proved by induction on the structure of t). As a result, if a language contains a constant or other ground term of sort A, then the corresponding instance of NL is inconsistent. If t : A is ground, then instantiating a to t yields t # t, which together with (F 2) yields a contradiction. Thus, there can be no witnessing terms for any instance of (F 4).
Remark 6.1. In classical logic, existential quantifiers can be eliminated using Skolemization, so Herbrand's Theorem can, in principle, be applied to any classical theory. However, this is not the case in other logics, such as intuitionistic logic. Even though nominal logic is based on classical first-order logic, Skolemization is not allowed, in the following sense: given a formula ∀x.∃y.φ(x, y), the Skolemized version ∀x.φ(x, f (x)) may not be equivalent if f is interpreted as an equivariant function.
For example, taking φ(x, y) = x # y, clearly ∀x : A.∃y : A.φ(x, y) is valid in nominal logic, so using the Axiom of Choice there must be some function f : A → A satisfying ∀x.x # f (x) for every x ∈ A. But this function is not equivariant, since the only equivariant function on A is the identity function. To see why, suppose f : A → A is equivariant. Then for a given a ∈ A, f (a) = (a f (a))·f (a) = a.
The main result of this section is a nominal version of Herbrand's theorem: that every theory of a particular form (in this case, every nominal-universal theory) has a model interpreted over a syntactic universe (that is, a nominal Herbrand model ).
Definition 6.2. A nominal-universal (or N∀-) formula is a formula of the form
where ψ is a quantifier-free formula mentioning only primitive formulas, and C is a constraint. Thus, a N∀-formula consists of a sequence of N/∀-quantifiers and ≈/#-constraints, followed by a quantifier-free body not mentioning # or ≈.
A nominal-universal theory (or N∀-theory) is a set Γ of closed N∀-formulas.
We consider only languages L that consist of a collection of name sorts A, a collection of data sorts D, and a collection of constants c : D and function symbols f : S → D, where D is a data sort; constants or function symbols that construct terms of name or abstraction sorts are not allowed. Similarly, we only allow constraints in negative positions. These restrictions prevent the built-in relations and function symbols of nominal logic from being redefined. In nominal Herbrand universes, we will interpret all terms as nominal abstract syntax trees, in which the swapping and abstraction functions and equality and freshness relations have specific intended interpretations but all other constants and function symbols are uninterpreted. Some satisfiable formulas (such as ∀a:.a # f (a) or ∀a.c = a a) which are unsatisfiable over such Herbrand models, so we exclude them from consideration.
We first need to define precisely what we mean by a Herbrand universe, structure, etc. in the context of nominal logic. As with ordinary first-order Herbrand models, we wish to define a syntactic universe over which we can interpret ordinary terms. In particular, uninterpreted function symbols f will be interpreted as syntactic term constructors f [t 1 , . . . , t n ] (this is an abbreviation for an n + 1-tuple (f, t 1 , . . . , t n )). Since abstraction, swapping, and freshness have special interpretations in nominal logic, they are not interpreted this way, but instead are interpreted using the appropriate machinery in nominal sets.
We assume the set of names is partitioned into one countable subset for each name-sort A, and write names of sort A as a A . Given a language L, we define its H-universe (H stands for Herbrand) as follows. the second case, by the first part we have a # u 0 . Let v 0 be a ground swappingfree term such that v 0 ≈ (a b)·u 0 holds. By induction, we have t 0 ≈ v 0 . Hence t 0 ≈ (a b)·u 0 , so the desired conclusion follows from (A2).
Proposition 6.14. Let M be a model and H be the H-model generated by the base B = {P H | M P }, and let φ be closed. Then (FMG) [15] Gabbay presents a model in which the set of names is uncountable and supports are countable. In Fresh Logic [14] an infinitary rule is used to obtain completeness relative to finite-support nominal sets. We believe that the support ideal approach is more general than the first two techniques, while remaining finitary in contrast to the third. §8. Future work. There are several interesting directions for future work. First, there may be other reasonable ways of dealing with the incompleteness of nominal logic relative to FS-models. We identified a larger class of models for which nominal logic is complete. Another reasonable approach might be to seek a weaker form of nominal logic that is complete with respect to FS-models. One possible starting point is the logic F Oλ ∇ of Miller and Tiu [26] , which has been shown to be interpretable in nominal logic by Cheney [5] (following a partial translation by Gabbay and Cheney [16] ). A third possibility is to work within second-or higher-order logic. In this case the incompleteness of nominal logic relative to finite-support models would be subsumed by the incompleteness of second-or higher-order logics relative to standard set theoretic models.
Second, the equivariance principle of nominal logic is very useful but also may be too powerful: for example, it guarantees that no linear ordering can exist on A, since a < b ⇐⇒ b < a must hold for any distinct a, b and binary relation <: A × A. Linear orderings are useful for both reasoning about (see e.g. [22] ) and programming with names. A second drawback to equivariance is that it makes the unification problem needed for backchaining in nominal logic programming or automated reasoning NP-hard [4] . Consequently, it is of interest to develop a non-equivariant form of nominal logic. However, equivariance appears to be crucial for establishing the desirable properties of the N-quantifier, and it is not obvious how to do without it. Ideas from model theory, in particular the study of order-automorphisms of first-order structures, may be applicable to this problem. §9. Conclusions. Nominal logic is an interesting first-order approach to formalizing common patterns of reasoning with names and binding in terms of invertible renamings and freshness. Its original semantics was based on a strong intuition that the set of names mentioned by specific values should be "small" so that the "large" set of all names can never be exhausted; however, this intuition was realized by requiring values to have finite support and the set of names to be infinite. This is too specific a definition of "small" and "large" to be captured by a first-order theory.
In this paper we have identified a class of models, called ideal-supported models, with respect to which nominal logic is complete. The key insight is to generalize the notion of "small as finite, large as infinite" used in the finite-support universe to a more abstract notion of size that is not tied to cardinality. This permits us to prove completeness, compactness, and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems for nominal logic relative to ideal-supported nominal sets.
We have also investigated the theory of Herbrand models for nominal logic. As originally formulated, nominal logic's term language could not be used to construct a suitable Herbrand universe for nominal logic. We have shown how an appropriate nominal Herbrand universes and models can be constructed by incorporating special symbols for names into nominal ASTs. We proved Herbrand's Theorem for a natural generalization of universal theories called nominaluniversal theories. This result is important to the ongoing study of automated deduction and logic programming in nominal logic.
